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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CLIFFORD F. PARKER,
DOROTHY EDWARD and
DOUGLAS EDWARD,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CADILLAC :MOTOR CAR
DIVISION and OWEN WRIGHT,
INC.,
Defendants-Respondents.

12718

Brief of Defendant-Respondent
Owen Wright, Inc.
PRELIMINARY STATEl\IENT
This appeal arises from a judgment of dismissal
solicited by the plaintiffs and based upon a "proffer
of proof" submitted by them in lieu of a trial.
The underlying action involves an automobile accident in Parleys Canyon on February 20, 1965, in which
a car driven by the plaintiff, Parker, crossed the center
line and struck a car in which the other plaintiffs, Dorothy and Douglas Edward, were passengers.
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The plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging negligence on the part of General :l\lotors and Owen \i\T right,
Inc. Subsequent attempts by the plaintiffs to plead
strict liability in tort, res ipsa loquitur, and breach of
express and implied warranties were <lenie<l, except for
the theory of implied warranty of repair, which was
allowed the plaintiffs as to Owen \Y right, Inc. in the
pretrial order.
Just prior to trial the plaintiffs sought a hearing
before the Honorable D. Frank \Vilkins for the express purpose of inviting a dismissal of their action in
order to appeal to this court on their arguments with
respect to strict liability and breach of warranty. Rather
than try their case, the plaintiffs presented an offer of
proof as to what they would be able to show at best if
a trial were held. On that offer, the court entered a
judgment of dismissal, and plaintiffs appealed.
STATEl\'IENT \VITH RESPECT TO \VHAT
FACTS ARE PROPERLY BEFORE
THIS COURT
This defendant objects to the plaintiffs' statement
of facts. It further objects to all references in the plaintiffs' brief which are not confined to the pleadings,
actions by the court below, an<l the plaintiff's' proffer
of proof.
The judgment appealed from was based solely
upon plaintiffs' proffer of proof and no other part of
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the record. Plaintiffs' counsel began by saymg (R.
187) :

"MR. LEEDY: Your Honor, if the plaintiffs were to go to trial :Monday, the evidence
which the plaintiffs would hope to elicit during the course of the trial is .... "
Thereafter, the court said ( R. 191) :
"THE COURT: On the ba.'lis of the offer
of proof, I suppose you're asking me-what
precisely are you asking me for?

• • •

THE COURT: I understand the plaintiff
is willing to submit it on the off er of proof
that they have made here."

• • •

:MR: LEEDY:

'Ve'll submit it.

THE COURT:

* * *

... On the basis of •u,•hat I have heard, if the
evidence were there, then, I would grant a directed verdict, and, I suppose, I am saying that
if that's your proof, there is no need in going
to trial ... "
MR. NEBEKER: It simply becomes a dismissal on the basis of the proffer of proof.
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TI-IE COURT: On the basis of what you
have told me, there is no need to go to
trial ... " (emphasis added)
Subsequently, the court entered a judgement of
dismissal, after approval as to form by plaintiffs' counsel, which stated, in part, ( R. 173) :
"[I]t appearing that the evidence proffered
by the plaintiffs was insufficient to establish
liability under the issues reserved in the pretrial
it was .... " (emphasis added)
In Corbet ti. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 381, 472 P.2d
430 ( 1970), this court said:
"On appeal to this court we review the judgments and orders appealed from on the basis of
the record upon which the trial court acted, and
do not permit the supplementing of our record with matters not before the trial court."
That sentiment applies here. The plaintiffs may not
induce the trial judge to act upon certain specific evidence and then argue to this court that other evidence
which the plaintiffs consciously failed to place before
the trial judge demonstrates that he was wrong.
The record discloses that the defendants were ready
to go to trial (R. 191). For their own convenience and
their own strategy the plaintiffs elected to proceed
another way. Having so elected, they should be strictly
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confined to the course they chose and the record upon
which they caused the court below to act.
TIIE OFFER 01<' PROOF
The plaintiffs recitation of the facts alters the
proffer of proof at certain critical places (Br. 6-7).
The offer of proof as given is as follows (R. 187-189):
l\IR. LEEDY: Your Honor, if the Plaintiffs were to go to trial :Monday, the evidence
which the Plaintiffs would hope to elicit during the course of the trial is that the Plaintiff,
Clifford Parker, in June of 1964, purchased
a 1964 Cadillac automobile from the Defendant, Owen 'Vright; that the Cadillac automobile was manufactured by the Defendant,
General ·Motors Corporation. The evidence
would show that the Plaintiff Parker had the
car for some two to three months when a problem in the primary electrical system of the car
manifested itself. The problem would be that
the engine would stop running while the Plaintiff was driving the car. The evidence would
show that at the time the engine would stop
running, that the Plaintiff would lose the
power equipment in the car, which included
power steering and power brakes. The evidence
would further show that the Plaintiff took the
automobile in for repairs to the Defendant,
Owen 'Vright, in Layton, Utah, some twelve

6

to thirteen times for repairs for the same problem. The evidence would further show that in
February of 1965, the Plaintiff, Parker, wrote
to the President of Cadillac
Company
of the Defendant, General
Corporation, and complained of his automobile, and
outlined the problems that he was having with
his car. The evidence would show that on February 14 of 1965, the Plaintiff received a reply
from the Customer's Relation Department of
Cadillac
Company, General
Defendant, and that in the reply, the Customer's
Relations man expressed interest and concern
over :Mr. Parker's problem and indicated he
would forward letters to their San Francisco
office, and also informed
Parker to take
the car back into Owen '1Vright, the authorized
Cadillac agency, for repair. The evidence
would show on February 16 of 1965, the Plaintiff Parker did that very thing when his automobile stopped running on him again, took his
automobile in for repairs because of the problem in the malfunction of the primary electrical
system. He received his car back on February
16 of 1965, and <lid not drive it again until
February 20 of 1965. At that time the Plaintiff Parker went on a fishing trip up Parleys
Canyon, and on his return, he was coming down
the canyon when the engine again cut out.
rendering the car without power assistance, to-
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wit, no power steering or no power brakes.
The evidence would show at that time the
Plaintiff Parker crossed the center line of the
road in Parleys Canyon, traveling at a speed
of approximately 40 miles per hour. The evidence would show that the Plaintiff Parker's
vehicle then crashed into the Plaintiff Edward's vehicle, or the vehicle in which the
Plaintiffs Edward were riding. The evidence
would show that all of the Plaintifs suffered
substantial injuries in the automobile accident.
The further evidence would show that the service manager of Owen Wright, Inc. wrote to
the Utah Highway Patrol, indicating that a
malfunction in the primary electrical system,
causing the engine to stop, would not render
the car without power assistance in his opinion.
The Plaintiffs would also intend to produce
expert testimony which would indicate that the
car was in fact defective, that the precise defect could not be precisely located, and that
because of the short time that the automobile
was driven before the defect manifested itself,
that in all probability, the defect existed at the
time of manufacture. The evidence would further show that the Plaintiff suffered severe
personal injuries, including one Plaintiff with
permanent partial disability as a result of the
accident."
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ARGUl\IENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFFS MISCOXCEIYE THE
STATE OF THE LA'\:r IN UTAH AND
ARE, IN EFFECT, ASKING THIS
COURT TO RENDER A DECISION IN
THE AB S T R A C T OX POINTS
'VHICH ARE EITHER l\lOOT OR ARE
NOT FAIRLY BEFORE THE COURT.
Over 31 pages of brief the plaintiffs imply that
Utah law is hopelessly backward, and then admit (Br.
15) that for at least the past seventeen years this court
has made available to plaintiffs everything that they
ask for here. They then suggest that such remedies are
somehow inadequate because they have not been made
available under the proper label.
The nub of the plaintiffs' case is revealed on pages
14 and 15 of their brief where they take exception to
one out of three elements listed by the court as a prerequisite for recovery in products cases which result in
injury.1 1 The three elements are: ( l) a defect at the
time of assembly; ( 2) such defect being discoverable by
a reasonable inspection; (3) injury caused by the defect.
Plaintiffs suggest (Br. 1.5, 31) that this court should
eliminate the phrase "discovery by reasonable inspection"
1/ Hooper v. General Moton Corporn.tion, 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d
549 (1953); Hewitt v. GenP,ral Tire and Rubber Co., 3 Utah
2d 354, 284 P.2d 471 (1955).
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and substitute therefor the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defeet existed at the time the manuf acurer or seller relinquished control of the product.
Bnt, that requested relief begs the essential questions:
I-las this court failed to prm·ide a just remedy for buyers of products in Utah? In the court below, did the
existence or absence of a cause of action for these plaintiffs depend upon the existence or absence of the "discovery upon reasonable inspection" element referred to
in the I I crcitt and JI oopcr cases?
These are the questions which must be answered.
A.

SIXCE

HOOPER v. GENERAL
CORP., PLAINTIFFS
IN THIS STATE HAVE BEEN ACCORDED FULL LATITUDE IN
PROSECUTING CAUSES OF ACTIOX AGAIXST l\IANUFACTURERS AND SELLERS.

N" ineteen years ago this court granted a new trial
in a case against General :Motors involving an alleged
defective wheel.1 2 The court commented on the admisof certain expert testimony, and held it was
error for the lower court to have instructed the jury
that it could not infer a manufacturing defect from the
fact that a wheel rim was found separated from its
spider after the accident. Inspection by the manufacz; Hooper, supra,.

IO
turer (the nub of plaintiffs' argument here) was not
identified as any obstacle to the plaintiffs.
Subsequently, without ever once finding the "discovery upon inspection requirement" any obstacle, this
court upheld causes of action against manufacturers
and sellers in Northern v. General .:llotors Corp., 2 Utah
2d 9, 268 P.2d 981 ( 1954) (alleged defective steering
mechanism): Jleu:itt v. General Tire and Rubber Co.,
3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471 (1955) (alleged defective tire); Farmers Grain Cooperative v. Fredrickson,
7 Utah 2d 180, 321 P.2d 926 ( 1958) (alleged defective
turkey feed); TV ebb 'l'. Olin ,lfathie.wn Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959) (alleged
defective receiver in rifle) ; and Palmer v. TV asatch
Chemical Co., 10 Utah 2d 383, 353 P.2d 985 ( 1960) (alleged defective carboy of acid).
Conversely, in the past quarter of a century or
more, this court has never held or even inferred that any
plaintiff failed to make out a cause of action against a
manufacturer because of a failure to prove that the
manufacturer could not discover an alleged defect by
testing. On the infrequent occasion when any comment
was directed to that element at all, this court merely
stated that in these days of X-rays and other elaborate
methods of testing steel, the appellant could not urge
that a defect in the steering mechanism was not discoverable.13
3/ Northern v. General Motors Corpuration, 2 Utah 2d 9, 268
P.2d 981 ( 1954).
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In II eowitt v. General Tire and Rubber Co., supra,
Justice Henriod pointed out that the legal principles
developed by this court had advanced to a point where
they virtually made manufacturers insurers of the safety of the consumer in Utah. And four years later, in
JVcbb v. Olin ftlathieson, supra, this court referred to
plaintiffs' action against the manufacturer as being
under-

" [Tl he now weJl established doctrine which

imposes liability upon the manufacturer for
injuries resulting from defects in such a product when it is used in accordance with its intended purpose." (9 Utah 2d at 279).

Ignoring all this, the plaintiffs here tempt the court
with words like "the modern formula" (Br. 15), and
the label of "strict liability", suggesting - but never
demonstrating - that there is a gulf bewteen rights of
plaintiffs in Utah and those in other states. No case
is cited to prove any such proposition in a practical, real
sense. Rather, plaintiffs confine themselves to general
commentary and quotes which are never related to anything that is going on in this case or in the law of the
State of Utah.
Even more crucial, the plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how the one supposed error in Utah law ( discoverability of an alleged defect by investigation) affects
them so as to make it a proper premise for proceeding
in this court. 'Ve turn now to that point.
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B.

PLAIXTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO
SIIO'V THAT Tl-IEIR CASE IS
UPON SOl\IE FURTHER D E VE L 0 P
E :N T IN
UTAH LAW.

Plaintiffs' proffer to the court below stated:
"The plaintiffs would also intend to produce
expert testimony which would indicate that the
car was in fact defective, that the precise defect could not be precisely located, and that
because of the short time that the automobile
was driven before the defect manifested itself,
that in all proahility, the defect existed at the
time of manufacture ( R. 189).
And, in their brief, plaintiffs concede that under any
legal theory, they must show that the car was defecti,·e
when it left the manufacturer or seller.
Under such a proffer, and admitted burden of
proof, where does it appear that the plaintiffs' case
failed because they allegedly could not prove that the
supposed defect was not discoyerable upon inspection?
. (cf. Hooper v. General 11Ioton; Corp., supra; Hewitt
v. Gt'neral Tire and Rubber Co., supra; Webb v. O!in
IJ.lathieson Chemical Corp., supra; Northern v. General
Motors Corp., supra; etc.) Clearly, the failure of the
plaintiffs' case in the court belmv, under Utah law as
it has existed for almost two decades, was not controlled
by the point which they now raise on appeal.

13

important, there is no showing on the decided
cases in this state that if this court eliminates the phrase
"discoverable upon inspection" and substitutes "defective at the time the manufacturer or seller relinquishes
control" (Br. 15, 31) - as requested by the plaintiffs
- the plaintiffs will have made out a good cause of
action, but not unless that change is made. Thus the
appeal, at best, involves a subject which is moot as to
this case, and the plaintiffs are putting this court in a
position of rendering some sort of an advisory opinion
upon a subject which is not squarely and properly before it in any demonstrable way.
The plaintiffs forced the judgment from which
they now appeal. They should be confined to the
premise upon which they based that tactic. And, if that
premise is in error under the existing law in this state,
as it obviously is, they should not be allowed either (I)
to place this court in a position of making generalizations which have no relevance to the case before it or
( 2) to state that the trial judge should be reversed on
some other ground with respect to a judgment which
the plaintiffs themselves solicited.

POINT II.
THE PLAIXTIFFS HA VE FAILED
TO
A CASE EYEX ON THEIR
O\VN LEGAL THEORY: THERE IS
NO SH(H\TJNG OF A DEFECT AT
THE
OF SALE; AND CAUSA-
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TION IS BASED UPON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that even under their own
theory they must prove: ( l) a defect existed; ( 2) the
defect was present at the time the product left the
manufacturer or seller, and ( 3) the defect caused the
injury (Br. 31). Those elements are not new to the law
of this state. This court has always required plaintiffs
to carry the burden of proving them in cases such as
this. Hooper v. General oMtors Corp., supra: H cwitt
v. General Tire and Rubber Co., supra; "/rlforthcrn t'.
General lJfotors Corp., supra; JfT ebb t'. Olin Jlathieson
Chemical Corp., supra; etc.
In measuring the evidence produced in the court
below against those elements it must be remembered
and emphasized that the plaintiffs chose facts which
constituted their case at its optimum, untested by crossexamination or presentation of any evidence by the defendants. That optimum case is fatally defective as
a matter of law with respect to at least two of the required elements.
The plaintiffs' own version of their best case states,
in essence, that Parker was coming down Parleys Canyon at 40 miles per hour when the car engine quit resulting in a loss of power assist to the steering and
power brakes. Thereafter, Parker's car crossed the center line of the highway and passed over two lanes of
traffic to collide with another car. ( R. 188, 189.) No
further explanation is offered, and it must be presumed
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that under no circumstances could the plaintiffs improve
that description of the accident.
The fatal defect in the plaintiffs' evidence is that
it nowhere alleges that Parker's car left its line of travel
and went across the road because of any failure of the
ignition, or power a'lsist to the steering, or power brakes;
or, ho'ft' such a thing happened, or why.
Conversely, the plaintiffs' prof fer states that
Parker had suffered a loss of ignition many times (R.
188), but makes no suggestion that steering or control
of the car was ever a problem.
Plaintiffs will argue that a jury could infer that
the accident was caused by the loss of power. But such
an inference would be pure conjecture. First, the jury
must infer that a loss of ignition in a large, modern
automobile means a loss of control. Then, the jury must
further inf er that the assumed loss of control caused
the car to cross two lanes of traffic resulting in an accident. Thus, the jury is required to pile an inference
upon an inference.
the required inferences
are untenable based on common experience.
It is not possible sensibly to inf er that when the
ignition goes off a car will dart to its left in a straight
line over two lanes of traffic and hit another car. All
natural inferences are to the contrary: that a heavy car
is built to track; that ignition going off does not throw
cars out of control; that loss of power steering at 40
miles per hour does not noticeably impair steering
capability and so on.
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On the other hand, it is reasonable to infer that
Parker's car drifted across the road and collided with
the car in which the Edwards' were driving because
Parker fell asleep at the wheel, or that he was intoxicated, or that the sun blinded him, or that he was in
insulin shock, and so on.
In Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d
986 ( 1954), this court refused to overturn a judgment
of dismissal based upon evidence which merely offered
the jury a speculation between probabilities. The court
said (2 Utah 2d at 19):
"The burden was upon plaintiff to prove the
charge of speeding. Such a finding of fact
could not be based on mere speculation or conjecture, but on a preponderance of the evidence. This means the greater weight of the
evidence, or as sometimes stated, such degree
of proof that the greater probability of truth
lies therein. A choice of proabilities does not
meet this requirement. It creates only a basis
for conjecture, on which a verdict of the jury
cannot stand."
Form 2.3 of the Utah Jury Instruction Forms recommends the following statement of the law based upon
Alvarado:
"The party upon whom the burden of proof
rests must sustain it by a preponderance of the
evidence. The Jaw does not permit you to base
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a venlict on speculation or conjecture as to the
cause of the incident in question."
\Vhen these plaintiffs fail on an unassailed version of their case to explain how the accident happened,
leaving both court and jury to speculate as to whether
and to what extent loss of ignition may be linked to an
accident on the other side of the road when many probable and competing explanations exist, the teaching of
this court is that they must fail as a matter of law.
l\Ioreover. it is not open to the plaintiffs to ask
this court now to let them have a chance to try their
case to a jury hoping to make out a better submission
the next time. They have chosen their substitute for
trial, and they have im·ol\'e<l the trial judge in a dismissal based upon the most favorable state of the evidence that they hoped to achieve at trial. As the trial
court was justified in entering a dismissal on speculative
evidence in Alt·ararlo v. Tucker. supra, so was the trial
court justified here.
In Price v. Ashby's, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 54, 354 P.2d
1064 ( 1960). the rule just discussed was applied by this
court in a fact situation much like the one present here.
Plaintiffs in that case sued General ·Motors and the
dealer alleging that their automobile was defective and
that the defect (the right front of the car sagged on
occasion) caused their car to run off the road, injuring
them . .At trial the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient
evidence of causation between the alleged defect and
the accident, and the trial judge granted a motion to
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dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case. On appeal,
this court affirmed, stating ( 11 Utah 2d at 56) :
"The car could have left the road for any one
or more of a number of reasons. For example,
a driver could have been momentarily dozing
or could have been inattentive and failed to observe the turn. There is no evidence here that
the driver ever attempted to turn the steering
wheel to cause the car to go to the left with the
road. \;Vith two or more possible causes such
as an inattentive driver and a mechanical defect that would have made it harder to turn;
proof that it may have been either is not proof
that it was in fact either. N' o evidence indicated
that either cause was the more probable."
To the same effect see Shramek v. General otors
Corporation, Chevrolet Division, 216 N .E.2d 244 ( S.
Ct. Ill. 1966), where, in a state using the "strict liability" label. a summary judgment was upheld against a
plaintiff who was unable satisfactorily to prove either
that a tire was defective when it left the manufacturer
or that the alleged defect caused an accident.
The plaintiffs have also failed to offer anything
more than a speculation with respect to the required
element that any alleged defect must be shown to have
existed at the time a product left the control of a manufacturer or seller. The plaintiffs submission below was
that the defect probably existed at the time of manufacture (hence at the time of sale). (R. 189.) But plain-
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tiffs admit that the alleged problem did not manifest
itself for two to three months after Parker purchased
the car in question. ( R. 197.) There is no showing how
far the car was driYen in that time-1,000 miles or 20,000 miles-; over what terrain; uncler what conditions;
by whom; or for what purpose.
important, there
is no showing that the car was not tampered with, involYed in some mishap (e.g. contact with water in some
major way), or altered. Under those facts, could the
case go to a jury without requiring improper speculatioll of them? 'Ve submit not.

POINT III.
PLAIN"TIFFS' AHGUMENTS UNDER
\\r ARilA:N'TY AXD I:MPLIED \VARAHE SUBJECT TO THE
SAME DEFECTS AS THOSE UNDER
STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT; AND
ARE AL SO INAPPLICABLE
EITHER FOR LACK OF PROOF OR
REC AUSE THEY
\V AIVED
BELOW.
Plaintiffs' offer of proof below did not contain
one word about a case on warranty. (R. 187-189.) Since
the judgment of the trial court from which this appeal is taken was based upon the offer of proof, the
plaintiffs ha\'e no argument at all on warranty, and
their references to other sources on that subject are
improper.
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In any event, the plaintiffs admit (Br. 25) that
in view of their main argument on strict liability "there
is no need to talk of warranties"---express or implied.
Their reliance on Prosser's statement (Br. 12) that
warranty arguments are not relevant at all, underscores
the point. 'fhey also acknowledge (Br. 31) that under
their theory the same elements apply to warranty cases
as to strict liability cases. That being so, every defect
in the plaintiffs' case discussed above with regard to
strict liability in tort applies with equal force to their
argwnents on warranty.
Moreover, the plaintiffs do not cite any authority
to this court favorable to their sugestion that cases
involving product related injuries should be considered
on the basis of contract rather than tort. To the contrary, this court has proceeded consistently on theories
in tort. See the cases cited supra, p. 10.
As to plaintiffs' argument on implied warranty
of repair as to this defendant-they had that theory
already in the court below. The pretrial order express·1y reserved it as an issue for them at trial. (R. 170, 171.)
Having once had that theory for trial and then voluntarily soliciting a dismissal of the issue with prejudice,
there is no sensible basis for asking this court to reverse
that dismissal and reinstate what the plaintiffs already
had to begin with. The plaintiffs have simply waived
that issue as to this defendant.
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POINT IV.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOES NOT
APPLY SINCE TlIE PLAINTIFF
PARKER WAS IN EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF THE CAR AT THE TIME
OF THE ACCIDENT, AND NO
CAUSAL CONNECTION HAS BEEN
ESTAllLISHED.
In JfTightman v. ountain Fuel Supply Company,
5 Utah 2d 373, 37.5, 302 P .2d 471 ( 1956), this court
reviewed the elements necessary to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur:
"In order to invoke this doctrine it is generally recognized that the following elements must
be present: ( 1) that the accident was of a kind
which, in the ordinary course of events would
not have happened had due care been observed;
(2) that it happened irrespective of any participation by the plaintiff; and (3) that the
cause thereof was something under the management or control of the defendant, or for
which it is responsible."
Items No. 2 and 3 of those required elements are
wholly absent from this case. As discussed earlier in
this brief, supra, pp. 15-19, the plaintiffs pro ffer of
proof fails to connect the alleged defect to the accident
in question, leaving the entire subject open to speculation on competing probabilities. Prosser, quoted by the
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plaintiffs (Br. 28-29) not only states that the evidence
must "reasonably eliminate other explanations"-which
it does not do here--he also states elsewhere in his works
that the doctrine is conceptually inaplicable by its very
nature where the plaintiff is proceeding against two or
more defendants simultaneously, as he is here. Prosser,
Law of
p. 221, 4th ed. 1971. This court has
adopted that view. Talbot v. Dr. JV. 11. Groves' Latterday Saints Ilospital, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872
(1968).
Additionally, two recent cases from other states
have rejected the applicability of res ipsa loquitur for
the same reasons present in this case. In Garofalo 'l.'.
General "llotors Corporation, 243 N".E.2d 691 (Ill.
1968), the Illinois Supreme Court noted that a defect
in the automobile in question (carbon monoxide fumes)
was"[N]ot the sole circumstance which could have
rendered Eugene Garofalo unconscious, nor
is it the sole reason the vehicle could have left
the highway. . . . " (243 N.E.2d at 694).
And, in Elliott v. General 1llotors Corporation, 232
So.2d 907, 909 (Ct. App. La. 1970), the court emphasized that
"[T]he applicability of the doctrine is clearly
prohibited where the accident might have occurred through the negligence of the plaintiff
as easily as through that of defendant."
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As in other aspects of this case, the plaintiffs rely
on viewing certain alleged facts with appropriate suspicion in order to reach their desired conclusions instead
of supporting such conclusions with actual evidence.
CONCLUSION
In their brief, the plaintiffs have presented a case
in a vacuum. They have not only misconceived the state
of the law in Utah but, more crucially, they have failed
to present a record to this court which squarely and
properly frames issues upon which this court can act
without doing anything more than rendering an advisory opinion on an abstract basis.
Having chosen their tactics and having failed on
those tactics to make out any proper case for review by
this court, the judgment of the court below against the
plaintiffs should be affirmed.
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